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Re-ordering the Urban Archipelago:  
Kenya Vision 2030, Street Trade and the Battle for 
Nairobi City Centre
Denis Linehan
Geography Dept., University College Cork, Ireland. [denis.linehan@ucc.ie]
Abstract 
The urban morphology and social and 
economic topography of Nairobi is sharply 
distinguished, heavily fortified and distinctively 
regulated. This form of urban territorial 
organization is an outcome of the legacies 
of colonialism and deeply inequitable local 
practices which continue to enforce Nairobi’s 
relationship to the foreign investor and the 
tourist rather than support the rights of the 
urban inhabitant.  The accelerating impact 
of neo-liberal economic planning continues 
to worsen these urban inequalities. In this 
context, this paper explores the influence 
of Kenya Vision 2030 on the restructuring 
of Nairobi and assesses its implication for 
street vendors, who have been increasingly 
displaced from trading in the City Centre. Their 
future and the attempts to re-order Nairobi 
city centre has emerged as a key site were 
debates over the global and local versions 
of the city and the contest between different 
developmental futures are acted out. 
Keywords:  
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Neo-liberalism; 
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Resumo
A morfologia urbana e topografia social e 
económica de Nairobi é marcadamente 
singular, severamente fortificada e distintamente 
regulada. Esta forma de organização urbana 
territorial é um resultado dos legados coloniais 
e de práticas locais profundamente desiguais 
que continuam a fortalecer as relações de 
Nairobi com o investidor estrangeiro e com o 
turista, em vez de apoiar os direitos do habitante 
urbano. O impacto acelerado do planeamento 
económico neo-liberal continua a deteriorar 
estas desigualdades urbanas. Neste contexto, 
este artigo explora a influência do Kenya Vision 
2030 na reestruturação de Nairobi e avalia 
as suas implicações para os vendedores 
ambulantes, que têm sido crescentemente 
deslocados do centro da cidade. O seu futuro 
e as tentativas de reordenar o centro da cidade 
de Nairobi surgem como lugar crítico onde 
se travam debates sobre as versões globais 
e locais da cidade e entre futuros diferentes 
de desenvolvimento.
Palavras chave: 
Quénia 2030; 
Nairobi; 
Neo-liberalismo;
Sector informal; 
Vendedores ambulantes;
Espaço público.
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I Introduction
In November 2007, a month before the recent 
highly controversial General Elections, the 
Kenyan government announced its intention 
to bid for the 2016 Olympics. If Kenya ever 
makes and wins this bid, it will be the first 
country in Africa to host the games, a prize 
covered in potential glory. Given the nature of 
the post election events – over 1100 people 
killed, hundreds of thousands displaced, and 
many of the slums areas of Nairobi coerced 
into deeper deprivation and insecurity, one 
would be forgiven for suggesting that the 
government’s eye on the global grandeur 
of the Olympics was at best, ill-timed and 
its understanding of the needs and mood 
of the people out of touch. During the last 
two decades Kenya has been faced with 
several socio-economic problems which have 
deepened the crisis facing its cities. These 
include increased poverty, rising levels of 
unemployment; increased insecurity; endemic 
corruption; high rates of urbanization; the 
growth of slums and informal settlements 
and deterioration of infrastructural and 
social services. Many of these issues relate 
to inequitable distribution of resources, 
the ongoing impact of state-capture and 
unequal costs borne by the poor during the 
period of structural adjustment instigated by 
the International Monetary Fund during the 
1990s. With an annual growth rate of  per 
cent, it is projected that Nairobi will grow to 
 million people by the year 2020. Already 60 
per cent of the city’s population live in informal 
settlements, and a considerable percentage 
of this population live on less that a dollar a 
day (Syagga, Mitullah & Gitau 2001). There 
was a clear logic however that permitted 
the government to be distracted from the 
complexity of these concerns to focus instead 
on its Olympic ambitions and aspirations to 
‘...spearhead the regeneration and 
development of Nairobi into a competitive 
world-class city’. It is now well understood 
that the race to host events such as the 
Olympics is a growing trend in the neo-
liberal city (Brenner & Theodore 2002). It is 
known in addition, that such aspirations are 
shaped in contexts where issues of prestige 
and enterprise overwrite concerns of social 
justice and redistribution. Inevitably, such 
aspirations have major implications for the 
urban experience and profound consequence 
for the future of the city.
This paper will explore recent shifts in the 
governance of Nairobi, and particularly the 
role the city has been awarded in Kenya Vision 
2030, a national programme for development 
launched in November 2006. In the analysis 
of the plans that have reshaped the city since 
then, two key areas will be considered, both 
of which will address the issues associated 
with neo-liberal urban strategy in Kenya. In 
the first part of the paper, I will address Kenya 
Vision 2020, and explore how its ambitions 
have been rearticulated into schemes to clean 
and beautify the city in order to establish 
Nairobi as ‘a global hub’ and reclaim the 
city’s colonial image as the ‘Green City of 
the Sun’.   In line with a range of authors, 
including Leys (197) and Slaughter (2004), 
the paper will contextualize these recent 
events in the urban legacies which continue 
to reproduce the spatial logic of colonialism 
which privileged the relationship to Europe, 
by sustaining the urban and infrastructural 
geography planned to support an export 
economy, global tourism and foreign direct 
investment. The second part of the paper 
will consider what consequences this urban 
condition has for experience of street vendors 
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or ‘hawkers’, whose contested presence 
in the city centre exemplifies the unequal 
urban political conditions of the urban 
archipelago of Nairobi, a city riddled with 
inequalities, and which is socially fragmented 
and intensely segregated. Despite being 
deeply entrepreneurial, and highly effective 
in providing goods and services to an 
impoverish population, informal street trade 
represents the antithesis of neo-liberal based 
models of development and modernization 
(Lewinson 2004). As is the case throughout 
the Global South, these needs and rights of 
these informal workers often confound formal 
and traditional mechanisms in urban planning, 
are not safeguarded by legal or social 
protections, and face persistence erosion of 
their rights and expulsions from public space 
(Bass 2000, Yankson 2000). Their experience 
in the context of accelerating urban forms 
of neo-liberalism presents an opportunity to 
interrogate the key actors and processes which 
are currently shaping the urban geographies 
in contemporary Africa (Fig.1).
Figure 1: Fruit and Vegetable Street Hawkers, Nairobi, January 2007
In the frameworks imagined by economic 
strategists caught up in the new scramble for 
Africa, Kenya is increasingly placed amongst 
five other African nations that could rival the 
‘Asian Tigers’ by 201. This notion is based 
on the premise that the so-called Asian Tigers 
of Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia were 
at the same stage of development as Kenya 
was 30 years ago, yet transformed themselves 
into modern economies within a generation. 
Since 2002, the Kibaki government stabilized 
the economy, improved administration and 
whilst corruption remains a core problem, the 
blatant kleptocracy of the Moi regime has been 
dissipated. The growth in tourism and the rise 
in the value of commodities boosted annual 
growth rates. This growth has encouraged the 
Kenyan Government to set out an ambitious 
development agenda, encapsulated in the 
publication and subsequent mobilization 
of Kenya Kenya Vision 2030 – a plan that 
proposes to restore Kenya economic 
potential. The Kenyan National Economic and 
Social Council (NESC) developed the Kenya 
Vision 2030, together with the international 
consultants, McKinsey & Company, who 
have also completed work on another former 
British colonial city – Mumbai – within a similar 
framework (Bombay First- McKinsey 2003). 
The formulation of Kenya Vision 2030 and its 
very specific discourse underline the degree 
to which a neo-liberal agenda has shaped the 
nature of national and regional planning, notably 
in terms of a new emphasis on the deregulation 
of markets and the new priorities awarded to 
private business interests in the formation 
of policy and the delivery of public services, 
at national, regional and urban level (Fig.2). 
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Figure 2: Vision 2030 | Source: Wahome Gakuru, Presentation of Kenya Vision Strategy, July, 2007, Nairobi
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The three pillars of Kenya Vision 2030 are 
organized around (1) economic aspirations 
– principally the maintenance of a economic 
growth of 10% per annum, (2) social 
aspirations that prioritizes ‘a just and cohesive 
society enjoying equitable social development 
in a clean and secure environment’ and (3) 
political aspirations which aims to create an 
‘....issue-based, people centred results 
oriented and accountable democratic 
political system’. In framing development in 
this manner, Kenya Vision 2030 mobilizes 
classic neo-liberal language and practices, 
particularly in terms of its emphasis on 
competition, management, performance, 
and accountability.
Kenya Vision 2030 has deep implications for 
Nairobi, as the restructuring the governance 
of the city has emerged a model for new 
forms of public management. In 2006 the 
Nairobi Metropolitan Growth Strategy (NMGS) 
was drafted – a strategy which amongst 
other things greatly increased the role of the 
private sector in devising urban policy. In the 
long term, under the auspices of Kenya Vision 
2030, the state intends to establish a Nairobi 
Metropolitan Region Development Board to 
‘…transform the Nairobi metropolitan region 
into a regional and global services hub’ (NESC 
2007).  Kenya Vision 2030 has also provided 
the context in which a new cultural and 
global location for Nairobi has been created. 
Directed by NESC, the Kenya Institute 
for Public Policy Research and Analysis 
(KIPPRA) – the principal public policy think-
tank – was directed to produce a strategy 
to raise the status of Nairobi to one of the 
‘…most attractive cities to live or do business 
in Africa’. NESC concluded that it ‘…has 
taken great interest in improving the status of 
Nairobi City with ultimate goal of transforming 
it into a regional services hub’. The Council 
has developed the view that given its heritage 
and its geographical location, Nairobi has 
the potential to become ‘…one of the most 
vibrant cities in the world’. In line with this new 
neo-liberal imaginary, the Director of Kenya 
Vision 2030, Wahome Gakuru has claimed 
that ‘…Nairobi is already a leading force in 
many sectors, and these are what we want 
to augment first. We intend to make Nairobi 
a regional services hub in tourism, hospitality, 
conferencing, transport, entertainment, 
financial and medical services.’ More 
specifically, as we will see in the substance of 
the paper below, Kenya Vision 2030 has been 
a key instrument which has shaped how the 
city has become a space in which aspirations 
to ‘…a clean and secure environment’ have 
been re-articulated. So far, the early ‘wins’ 
claimed as part of this process have included 
the ‘…re-engineering management of the 
Nairobi City Council, disaster management 
initiative, rehabilitation of street names, road 
marking, street and flood lighting, landscaping 
and greening of the city’ (NESC 2007).
This new ‘location’ for the city and its ambitions 
are shaped by a number of collaborating 
institutions and organizations who have 
mobilized market based systems into public 
policy. Drawing heavily upon the strategies 
developed in Malaysia and Singapore, Gakuru 
has been mandated to develop Nairobi 
through partnerships between public and the 
private sector. The role of the international 
donor community has also been important in 
framing these developments. The legitimacy 
for these initiatives has been shaped in the 
context of ‘good governance’ – in the case 
in a programme element enabled by the 
World Bank under its ‘Local and Municipal 
Governance and Finance (formerly Municipal 
Reform) stream. Shaped in this international 
policy environment, and incentivized by the 
conditions set out by World Bank loans, 
the Ministry of Planning has increasingly 
embraced concepts of privatization and 
partnership. In itself, this approach has been 
facilitated by the regulatory environment of the 
Structural Adjustment Programmes, whose 
rules about participatory approaches to policy 
formulation and implementation, together 
with a renewed emphasis on privatization 
have encouraged the Kenyan government 
to ‘empower’ stakeholders and support a 
participatory approach in policy development. 
This approach conforms closely to the notion 
that government should focus on ‘steering’ 
(policy setting and coordination) and leave the 
‘rowing’ (delivery of publicly supported services) 
as much as possible to the private sector. 
(Osborne & Gaebler 1992). The provision of 
new roads – notably in the Nairobi Toll Road 
project – has already been implemented.  In 
line with this thinking, the state intends to 
privatize other key infrastructure facilities, 
specifically Telcom Kenya, Kenya Power 
and Lighting, Kenya Reinsurance Company 
and National Bank of Kenya.  It is planned in 
addition that the state will implement further 
public-private initiatives, identified for Nairobi 
as investments in multi-story parking garages, 
construction of retail markets, and low and 
middle income housing. 
The reality in Nairobi is however that the dire 
failure of the local state to provide basic urban 
services means that privatization is deeply 
entrenched in the city, notably in areas such as 
waste disposal, the provision of street lighting 
and water and most obviously, security and 
policing. However, the relative speed, at 
which these more structural initiatives became 
prioritized under the Kibaki government, is 
testimony to the renewed political support 
given the private sector. A key actor to emerge 
has been the Kenya Private Sector Alliance 
(KEPSA), formed in 2003. This lobby group 
brings together private sector associations in 
Kenya to develop guidelines for ‘partnering 
with the public sector to provide new and 
existing services’. In Nairobi, KEPSA has 
also been instrumental in supporting the 
City Council of Nairobi Stakeholder Forum 
(CCNSF)’, a partnership initiative between 
the City Council of Nairobi and the private 
sector. The legitimacy of these organizations 
to intervene in the provision of public services 
and in the formulation of urban policy has been 
strengthened by the failure of the local state. 
Within the city there is a widespread distrust 
and dissatisfaction with the city council. The 
decline of Nairobi has been widely understood 
in terms of corruption at ‘City Hall,’ too much 
central government interference, and the rapid 
informal development of the city. Nairobi’s city 
council was abolished for almost a decade 
(1983-1992) by the Moi government, which 
placed the city under a presidential-headed 
commission, an act that opened the floodgates 
to economic liberalization and accelerated 
the collapse of the orderly planning and 
development of the city.
A key consequence of these political 
conditions, Katumanga (200) argues was a 
‘diminished state-provisioning capacity and 
unwillingness to protect public interests.’ This 
form of urban politic opened up a political 
space that ‘…spawned anomic tendencies 
within the regime and among social groups 
and individuals, with struggles in defense 
of economic position against each other at 
one level, and against the state and local 
councils at another. [This] regime facilitates 
the criminalization of urban existence in a bid 
to ensure its survival... The net effect is the 
perversion of social order and the emergence 
of bandit economies’ (Katumanga 200, 
p.219). The antagonistic geographies of the 
urban archipelago and the spatial imprint of the 
City Council’s decent into officially sanctioned 
banditry and laissez faire strategies are 
everywhere. For example, in the Eastlands 
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In this context and supported in the funding 
regimes sponsored by the World Bank, the 
activities of the Nairobi Central Business 
District Association (NCBDA) to streamline 
management of the city’s affairs has been 
facilitated further. Following a thirty year hiatus, 
question of urban planning have returned to 
the agenda, sponsored particularly by the 
Architectural Association of Kenya (AAK), 
who have commenced the development of 
a Master Plan for Nairobi. Within this new 
framework enabled by Kenya Vision 2030, a 
number of new reforms have been proposed. 
NESC have proposed the following: 
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area – especially in residential estates as 
Umoja, Dandora, Kayole and Zimmerman, six 
and seven story buildings stand awkwardly 
on small plots originally zoned for the 
construction of bungalows. Though thwarted 
by the KANU-MOI kleptocracy, throughout 
the 1990s various attempts were made to 
reform the city council. Though his activism 
meant his tenure was short-lived, the major 
of Nairobi - Steve Mwangi - suspended 
several key officers of council, including the 
town clerk and chief planner (Karuga 1993). 
The ‘Nairobi City Convention’ (July 1993) 
revealed publicly the problems of greed and 
corruption, excessive central government 
interference, and unsustainable budgetary 
situation of the city. The ‘Nairobi We Want’ 
conference that followed animated a range 
of actors from the public and private sector 
and the action plan sought to reform many 
aspects of the governance of the city, whilst 
underlining the need to root out corruption 
at City Hall, and ensure professionalism 
amongst the city’s administrators (Karuga 
1993). Since coming into power in 2002, 
the Kibaki government was more open to 
facilitating this reform. A key report on Nairobi 
City Council, prepared by the Kenya Anti-
Corruption Commission severely criticized 
the financial and administrative structure of 
the city council, paving the way for further 
reform and in many ways, legitimizing the 
continuing privatization of local services. 
These administrative issues and questions of 
governance have had profound impacts on 
urban planning and policy.
1 Divide the city into five boroughs, each headed by a high-level management board, providing local services.
2 Complete a consultative Nairobi metropolitan growth plan in order to harmonize current stand alone initiatives, include the city and the satellite towns around it, and prepare the relevant legislation for it.
3 Access immediate funding to resettle hawkers in smaller permanent markets citywide.
4 Improve the policing and enforcement of NCC bylaws.
5 Clean up the city and enforce health and sanitation regulations.
5 Begin a rapid results traffic management system
6 Erect street names, directions, universal address system, and repair the roads and complete city-wide street lighting.
7 Pedestrianize the CBD, reduce vehicular traffic there.
8 Construct multi-storey downtown parking garages on a Public-Private Partnership basis.
9 Privatize garbage collection.
10 Secure all public parks and rehabilitate them.
11 Begin rehabilitation of the Nairobi River Basin.
12 Establish a Nairobi Metropolitan Police.
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These strategies have been presented as a 
set of benign urban strategies. However, if the 
language of flow and de-liberalization present 
the neo-liberal geography of Kenya Vision 
2030 at national and metropolitan level – in 
practice, the events at street level have proved 
to be exclusionary and divisive. Rather than 
evolving an urban policy that meets the needs 
of the urban inhabitant, the city has been 
captured by the practices of global prestige 
– in part sanctioned by international donors 
such as the World Bank and facilitated by the 
international consultancy group, McKinsey, 
who have already created comparable 
vision strategies for Mumbai (Bombay First-
McKinsey 2003).
The new political contexts are well 
represented in plans to revitalize the city 
centre, where partnerships between the 
public sector and private companies have 
converged on policies to privatize services, 
space and exclude the poor to keep the city 
attractive to investors and tourists. In line with 
the 2030 aspirations, for the City Council the 
‘provision of an ideal urban environment’ 
is presented as ‘a new beginning for a 
working nation’. In terms of urban design 
and planning, the form that ‘beautification’ 
takes - upgrading public parks, pedestrian, 
urban forestation and landscaping - appears 
essentially progressive. In fact, the opposite 
is often the case. Perverse outcomes from 
apparently progressive initiatives are often 
perpetuated in the grossly inequitable 
landscape of Nairobi, as interest groups have 
evolved sophisticated strategies to hijack the 
progressive aspirations of developmental 
initiatives. In this case, under the umbrella 
of improved urban governance, apparently 
benign proposals to address urban quality of 
life issues and improving public safety have 
been turned into exclusionary practices in 
the city. For instance, under the guidance 
of the UN Habitat Safer Cities programme, 
the Safer Cities Nairobi Action Group was 
established (UN Habitat 2002). Whilst 
inclusive in terms of the attention it placed 
on crime and personal safety in slum areas, 
the most significant impact has been in 
the city centre. UN Habitat praised itself 
in noting that ‘…the key crime prevention 
through environmental design deliverables 
are expected to be realized by September 
2006 and showcased as ‘quick-wins’ at the 
Africities 2006 summit to be held in Nairobi 
(UN Habitat 200). However, in terms of the 
UN’s other objectives in Kenya, principally 
leading people out of poverty and protecting 
their livelihoods, the Safer Cities Programme 
has arguably backfired, as the initiative has 
cloaked deeply exclusionary practices, 
involving forcing women and disabled street 
traders from the city centre, and supporting 
the deeply exclusionary ‘security’ discourse, 
which has been used widely to legitimate 
the city council’s destruction of kiosks and 
shacks from the roadside and exclusion of 
street traders from the city centre.
In the first public-private partnership initiative 
facilitated by the City Council, with support 
from local banks and the Aga Khan Foundation, 
the city council pedestrianized Mama Ngina 
street, an area proximate to quasi-public 
park created to memorialize to the American 
Embassy bombing of 1998. With the 
exception of vendors selling newspapers and 
occasionally second hand books, the area is 
completely free of ‘hawkers’. There is plenty of 
seating for office workers to take shelter from 
the sun during their lunch hour and the area 
has become popular for peripatetic Christian 
preachers who engage the small crowds 
without interference. Undoubtedly, the urban 
environment around Mama Naina street has 
improved, though at a discrete cost to liberty. 
The pleasant grassed elements in this area 
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are protected by rough cuts of barbed wire 
and the area is under intensive surveillance by 
the Askari – the City Council’s special police. 
This piece of urban design underlines that the 
‘clean up‘ of Nairobi has a more complicated 
story to tell – in particular in terms of how it 
operates as a form of spatial and social. 
Bye-laws have been mobilized as a key 
instrument in this process. Not only are 
bye-laws are key way of administrating and 
regulating a busy city centre, but remarkably, 
fines from bye-laws are the third most 
important source of income for the City Council 
after rates and business licenses. Additionally, 
bye-laws are source of income for the Askari 
who widely exploit the bye-laws as a mean 
of extracting bribes from locals and street 
venders. Since colonial times, fines could be 
imposed for, hawking, spitting, peeing and 
jaywalking. Fines for these offences were 
modernized and additionally a range of new 
offences were established. In line with the city’s 
new strategy to turn itself into a global hub, 
a new policy on the city’s existing and new 
bye laws was enforced. During 2007, a new 
by-law was introduced to control motorists 
and pedestrians who fail to stop at zebra 
crossings in Nairobi. Those caught risk arrest 
and a Sh. 3,000 fine, about half a month 
wages for the average worker. The possession 
of plastic bags was also made an offence. 
Smoking in public was also banned and 
smoking zones in the Central Business District 
designated. People found smoking in public are 
liable to a fine of up to Sh. 2,000 (about a third 
of the monthly income for a manual labourer 
in Nairobi) or six months imprisonment. Since 
their introduction, hundreds of people have 
been charged in court over the two by-laws. 
In addition to these forms of urban regulation, 
an increasing number of bye-laws have been 
introduced to adversely impact on hawking in 
the city.
‘Hawking’ a term inherited from the colonial 
period is a well established survival strategy for 
the urban poor. Throughout the South, street 
vending is also directly associated with urban 
livelihoods. In his work on Johannesburg, 
Simone argued that informal activities such 
as hawking reproduce ‘bare life’ for many 
residents in the city, in conditions of relative 
poverty (Simone 2004). Street trading is 
however more diverse than represented 
by Simone, and the ease of entry make 
undoubtedly a major source of employment 
in contemporary Kenya. Throughout Kenya, 
employment in the trade grew from .1 
million people in 2002 to 6.8 million in 2006, 
a rise of 33.4 per cent. This situation mirrors 
the importance of informal trading to the 
livelihoods and economies of cities, providing 
social and political stability to the most 
marginalized and vulnerable communities. 
However, despite their economic importance, 
hawkers have been continuously exposed 
to criticism which has projected them as 
an unruly intrusion into the orderly city. The 
position of these sole-traders is a matter of 
major contestation in most developing world 
cities. Rajagopal notes that in India, the 
‘pheriwalas’ or street hawker:
‘…are a part of the economy 
that spurs consumption, yet 
they function as quintessentially 
vagrant figures requiring 
discipline.  The pheriwala is thus 
a figure bridging consumption 
and destruction. The pheriwala 
is a real figure, working in circuits 
seen as illegal in relation to the 
formal economy, but is also 
metaphorical, symbolizing a kind 
of disorder as a struggling but 
nevertheless illicit entrepreneur.’ 
(Rajagopal 2001, p.92)
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A similar perspective by and large, radiates 
through formal and media representation 
of the Nairobi street hawker also and as a 
vagrant and urban interloper, their needs 
and development have traditionally been 
oppressed. Under the revised by-laws 
contained in the Kenya Gazette dated July 
6 2006, anyone found buying goods from a 
hawker in ‘non-designated’ areas will also be 
arrested together with the seller. The penalty 
for both hawkers and buyers will be similar to 
that imposed on smokers. In addition to these 
new regulations, since 2002, the City Council 
has explicitly sought to reclaim the city centre 
and other sub-centres in the city – notably 
Westlands - from hawkers who have set up 
shop trading or Jua Kali operations in the 
lanes and thoroughfares of the city (NCBDA 
2002). (Jua Kali is a Kiswahili term that literally 
means ‘under the hot sun’, and refers to 
outdoor workshops). This form of urban 
regulation essentially pushes the slum back 
into the slum. The ‘leaky’ slum - represented 
in shacks and kiosks - is demolished and 
effaced from the streetscape. When the NARC 
Government took office in 2002, a campaign 
to rid Nairobi of hawkers was commenced with 
great determination by both civic authorities, 
local business organization and the Kenyan 
Police. With its own income base drawn from 
the formal economy, the local media has 
rationalized these initiatives:
‘While hawkers do indeed have the right to earn 
themselves a living, it is important that they do 
not trample on the rights of other Kenyans in 
their quest. Time and again they have declined 
to use the special zones set aside for their 
use. Their crowding the city centre creates 
an atmosphere of disorder that permits and 
promotes pick pocketing and mugging. 
The permission of hawking on the streets is 
therefore an imperilment of the tranquillity and 
security of the city’s residents.’ (Mbalo 2007)
Historically, the contest between social classes 
and among social groups for the control of 
public space has been an important aspect 
of urban politics. Indeed, claiming public 
space by excluding so called ‘undesirable 
others’ continues to be a characteristic of 
contemporary urban practices. But whilst in 
the West the implications for the inhabitants 
of the city are generally restricted to minority 
groups – such as the homeless, drug users 
or sex-workers - in Nairobi these policies 
have profoundly negative implications for the 
urban masses, thousands of whom rely on 
street trading as a way of making a living. 
In many ways, the privatization of the CBD, 
reproduces the underlying form of territorial 
organization which have created in the private 
neighbourhoods in Nairobi’s suburbs over the 
last two decades. As elsewhere in urban Africa, 
hawkers in Kenya have been regarded as an 
affront to the modernizing city, and over time, 
many attempts have been made to shift them 
from the city centre (Lewinson 2004). This 
oppression has a long history. Strict rules in 
the colonial period ensured that street vending 
was carefully controlled, and has already 
been described, numerous bylaws from that 
time have sought to regulate the street trade 
in the city. Conflict between hawkers, council 
official and police have a long history in 
Nairobi. Traders face persistent harassment, 
confiscation and loss of goods. The City 
Council itself has confirmed that there have 
been cases of city council Askaris soliciting 
for sex from female hawkers arrested on the 
streets, as an inducement for their release.
As critical in undermining the rights of traders, 
there has been a systematic underdevelopment 
of new public markets in Nairobi, despite the 
extraordinary growth in population. In 1972, 
the Metropolitan Growth Strategy indicated 
that  new markets were to be developed 
on public lands throughout the city. Over thirty 
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IV The ‘hawker menace’
In addition to the activities and goals of 
Nairobi City Council, addressing the ‘hawker 
menace’ and improving the city-centre has 
been encouraged by the Nairobi Central 
Business District Association (NCBDA). This 
organization was founded in 1997 by the 
managing director of Sarova Hotels, Sandy 
Vohra. From an initial group of just nine other 
Nairobi businesses, the organization currently 
has a membership of over 100 companies 
years, funds to develop these sites never 
emerged. Street hawkers have also been a 
victim of corruption. Mainly during the Moi 
regime, most of the public lands the markets 
were intended to be built upon were stolen by 
political elites through the process known as 
‘land-grabbing’ – an endemic form of state-
capture whose legacy continues to distort 
the equitable development and distribution of 
services (such as schools, public housing and 
health clinics) across the city (Klopp 2007). 
Unsurprisingly, the Metropolitan Growth 
Strategy which was funded by the World 
Bank, has been described as a ‘…tool for 
state intervention and supported interests 
of the hegemonic class alliance of the local 
bourgeoisie and Multinational Corporations 
while neglecting the interests of the urban 
majority’ (UN Habitat). Undermined by endemic 
corruption and grand theft of donor capital, the 
lasting legacy of this plan include the Dandora 
dumpsite, once designated as ‘Sector 6’ of 
a World Bank-Kenya government low-cost 
housing initiative, but now a sprawling slum 
on the edge of an environmental time-bomb. 
The experience of another group of people 
– namely urban gardeners and farmers - also 
illustrates how they have faced the same 
steady erosion of their rights to space as 
hawkers. According to Freeman, by 198 
there were almost a hundred thousand people, 
mostly women, subsisting in urban gardens 
on public lands in Nairobi (Freeman 1991). But 
like the hawkers, these people too have been 
steadily disinherited from their rights to the city, 
as informal settlements have been cleared or 
grabbed by the Kenyan elite (Macharia 1992). 
Katumanga (200) notes that ‘…the ruling elite 
responds to the possibility of losing power by 
using neo-patrimonial structures to selectively 
allocate public spaces to their cronies, thereby 
subverting social order and undermining 
democratisation, security and social harmony’. 
In this period, attempts were made to relocate 
hawkers from the CBD to the Mwariro Market, 
then Citi-stalls, then to the streets around the 
Nairobi River and the Kirinyage Road, then 
to the Burma Market next to City Stadium. In 
2001, hundreds of hawkers were moved to the 
Ngara Market, shortly before the 2002 general 
elections, in what was seen as an attempt 
to persuade them to vote for the ruling party 
– Kanu. During each of these moves, street 
fighting between council Askaris, police and 
traders were frequent and violent. The result 
is as the informal sector has grown, an acute 
shortage of market space exists and hawkers 
consequently are forced to undertake most of 
their trade in the street. Other markets outside 
the city-centre such as those at Kariokor, 
Burma, Eastleigh, Jericho and Ngara are 
already full. The destruction by fire of the Toi 
market in Kibera as a consequence of post 
election violence in January 2008, will inevitably 
also push more vendors on to the streets. 
Additionally, the city centre remains the most 
profitable site for trading - offering the least-
cost/highest return location for street traders.
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from the city centre. It has initiated a range 
of interventions, many of which included 
regeneration of footpaths, and assisting the 
police to address crime in the city centre more 
effectively. However, from the beginning, the 
presence of street vendors was the problem 
identified by the organization: Mr. Philip Kisia, 
the chairman of this association noted:
‘One of the problems in our city is 
the vast number of hawkers who are 
trying to make a living in one way or 
another. One can understand the 
frustration of business people who 
see these “competitors” sometimes 
hawking right in front of their shops 
the very items that the shopkeepers 
are selling. Yet the hawkers do not 
have to pay rent for buildings and 
therefore are in a position to undercut 
the prices charged by shopkeepers….
The hawkers should not be seen as a 
problem: they play an important role in 
society. But what we need is a better 
organisation of this segment of the 
business community. We should learn 
from what is done in other countries. 
For instance, on weekends when there 
is less business activity in the city, they 
could be allowed to operate in streets 
which are designated for this purpose. 
The main thing is to organise their 
activities in an orderly manner so that it 
does not interfere with other business 
or causes harm to the environment.’ 
(Kisia 2000, p.24)
In this context, the NCBDA has successfully 
completed a survey of informal traders which 
enabled them to obtain information on the 
number of traders, nature, volume and income 
from their business. A report by the NCBDA 
Street Vending in Nairobi: A Socio-Economic 
Survey in the Central Business District-Nairobi 
concluded that ‘...street vending has been 
largely perceived as a major contributor to 
congestion in urban centres’.  The census 
registered some 14,000 people trading in the 
city, most involved in activities that range from 
the sale of vegetables, and street food like 
roasted maize, sliced pineapple, sugar cane, 
chapati, githeri, and ugali. Another group 
focuses on magazines, toys, sunglasses, 
shoes and clothes and other goods of a similar 
nature. Its own vision document – Nairobi 
the choice of Africa, Clean, Secure, Vibrant - 
Home for All – sums up its approach to what 
is commonly represented as the ‘hawker 
menace’ very well. The NCBDA aims to ‘…
ensure that areas within the Central Business 
District and its environs are sustained at 
levels consistent with a cosmopolitan city 
with investment opportunities, an enabling 
business environment and the necessary 
amenities’ (NCBDA 2007).
Given its background primarily in the Asian 
businesses community, the NCBDA initially 
was very careful in developing a non-
confrontational relationship with the hawker 
community, but nevertheless, soon found 
itself converging on a new cartography of 
exception. Through funds and technical 
assistance drawn in from the Ford Foundation 
and despite initial skepticism and significant 
dispute amongst the hawker community, as 
to which constituency would be ‘anointed’ 
by the NCBA, it encouraged briefly the 
development of a quasi-representative 
hawkers association.  In this way, it has 
incorporated Nairobi Urban Alliance, a group 
that seeks to represent hawker’s rights in the 
city, under the auspices of the Kenya National 
Alliance of Street Vendors and Informal Traders 
(KENASVIT). The NCBDA also organized a 
trip to South Africa for individuals drawn from 
the Nairobi City Council (NCC), the Ministry 
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of Local Government, the private sector and 
where they sought to import models of urban 
intervention. With one hand the NCBA have 
sought to support initiatives to incorporate 
street traders into the political system, whilst 
with the other they have encouraged hard-
line initiatives to forcibly clear them off the 
streets. But whilst scripting its interventions 
as inclusive – ‘Its goal is to ensure that the 
areas within the Nairobi’s central business 
district and its environs are clean, secure 
to peoples of all classes and races’ - the 
NCDA has clear agenda to ‘restore’ the 
city centre and have used their influence to 
shape this strategically. In addition to the 
more immediate impact on livelihoods, the 
battle over the city centre is fraught with 
colonial politics. The exclusion of hawkers, is 
not in  fact the exclusion of unruly hawkers, 
thugs and criminals as it is often depicted in 
the local media and in common discourse 
amongst the elites in the city, but is in fact 
the exclusion of one set of entrepreneurs 
by another, namely of African Kenyans by 
Asian Kenyans. In seeking to reorder the 
city centre, Asian Kenyans enforce their 
commercial value of their colonial legacy. It 
was the Asians who were sanctioned by the 
British to operate from the earliest times in 
Nairobi as the shop-keepers and commercial 
service provider, and they remain clearly in 
control of the commercial property in the city 
centre, and all the major shopping centres 
in the city such as at Westlands, Hurlingham 
and Gigiri. The expulsion of hawkers from the 
city centre is as such a process riddled with 
racial and colonial implications, a situation 
often left unsaid in public debates.
Despite the rhetoric of inclusion projected 
by the NCBDA, the final outcome clarified 
that these fictions of empowerment were 
characterized by processes of social 
exclusion and marginalization. This process 
has been progressively exclusionary. In 
2003, encouraged by the first NARC Local 
Government minister, Karisa Maitha, the 
City Council introduced a license system, 
which attempted to control street vending. 
Each hawker paid 200 shillings and was 
offered a permit to operate from one of 23 
designated back lanes in the CBD. Following 
this new licensing system, later that year, 
the Nairobi City Council moved thousands 
of hawkers to quieter roads and lanes in the 
central business district, in a bid to reduce 
congestion. This strategy drew upon the 
experiences in South Africa, where plans 
have evolved to constrain street-trade to 
designated areas. By the beginning of 200 
however this initiative did not meet the needs 
of the new urban regime. A new discourse 
to rationalize their expulsion from the city 
centre was pushed into the public domain. 
Hawkers become re-scripted as a security 
risk and ‘a nuisance to the environment’, 
specifically blamed for the rising levels of 
street waste in the city. At this time, the city 
clerk John Gakuo convinced the Central 
Government to assist the city council by 
allocating a contingent of law enforcement 
officers to augment the City ‘Inspectorate 
Officers’ or Askari. This final decision for 
ultimate expulsion of the hawkers was taken 
at Cabinet level, as it was only at this level, 
that the police could be given clear instruction 
to support the 200 or so City Council Askari 
to clear the streets. According to the Local 
Government minister, Musikari Kombo, ‘We 
were allowing hawking in the streets but 
realized that they had been infiltrated by 
thugs. They made Nairobi a risky place to 
do business in.’ (Mogusu 2006). Another 
commentator put it ‘Alive to the fact that 
no self-respecting city would allow itself to 
be overrun by unruly traders, a permanent 
solution had to be found’( Kago 2007).
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The result was steady pressure on street 
vendors throughout 2006. Between June 
and September 2006, skirmishes between 
council officials and the hawkers intensified 
(Fig. 3 & 4). At the same time President 
Kibaki announced the up to a dozen new 
markets would be built for hawkers across 
Kenya, two specifically in Nairobi (Muthurwa 
and Westlands) and that in future the 
‘hawking’ would be recognized as an s an 
integral element of the economy. Indeed 
through a range of initiatives, offering loans 
and training, an entrepreneurial discourse 
was mobilized to reframe the informal 
sector as ‘the successful business people 
of tomorrow’. This language sought in some 
way of soften the blow of expulsion from the 
streets, but did little to mitigate the justifiable 
anger of the street vending community or 
the use of police violence used to hasten 
their department from the city centre. Once 
politically sanctioned the use of riot police in 
this situation has been organized, systematic 
and violent. Scores of hawkers and policemen 
as well as the Askaris sustained injuries these 
events. Media reports underline that that the 
police’s use of tear gas, live ammunition and 
crude weapons on both sides, such as iron 
bars, truncheons and axes is commonplace 
during these disturbances. One policeman 
and two hawkers were killed during these 
confrontations and the level of sustained 
state-sanctioned violence against this group 
of urban entrepreneurs was intense enough 
to mean that by the middle of 2006, for the 
city for the first time in a generation became 
‘hawker free’ and largely remained so for 
almost 18 months. The ‘hawker menace’ 
had been removed, temporarily it turned 
out, as just two months before the 2007 
election street traders were permitted to 
come back into the city centre again, in a 
bid to ensure support for Kibaki’s bid for 
re-election. However, the logic of claiming 
the city centre for ‘legitimate business’ and 
as a basis for Kenya’s bid to create a new 
globally integrated, ‘World Class’ city remains 
in place. As I write, street hawkers again 
face expulsion – some to take up a limited 
amount of trading pitches in Muthurwa, in 
the only market completed in the Nairobi 
in over a decade, but most, once again, 
will be deprived of their livelihoods and 
will be forced to depart into those spaces 
of urban oblivion beyond the neo-liberal 
urban imaginary.
Figure 3: Police clash with Hawkers on the Streets of Nairobi, 
June 2006 | Source: The Nation June 5, 2006
Figure 4: This satirical observation on the appeal of Vision 
2030, presents an oblique criticism of the new vision for 
Nairobi, and the consequence for security
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V Conclusion
In the cities of the Global South, and notably 
the cities of sub-Saharan Africa – Addis 
Abba, Nairobi, Dar es Salem, a cartography 
of exception in practiced to such a degree 
to have transformed these cities into urban 
archipelagos. The urban morphology and 
social and economic topography of these cities 
are sharply distinguished, heavily fortified and 
distinctively regulated. These urban conditions 
have come to their absolute expression 
in Nairobi during the recent post-election 
violence, when the slum areas of the city were 
effectively sealed off by the police and the 
army and the population was ‘locked down’ 
like prisoners. As such, the urban archipelago 
is made in conditions that overturn the urban 
ideals once enshrined in the liberal western 
city-state – represented in the democratic 
spaces of libraries, museums and public parks. 
In contrast, the urban archipelago dilutes the 
public sphere and fragments rights and legal 
status. Its spatial form is reflected in the slum, 
the gated community and the private fortress 
and its geography is a patchwork system of 
bounded and secured neighbourhoods and 
highly regulated forms of movement and 
mobility. Nairobi is consequently a city of walls 
and boundaries, a city of enclaves, a fortress 
city – a model of urban development repeated 
throughout the continent and in many places 
throughout the Global South (see Obudho 
& Aduwo 1992). Underwriting this urban 
topography is a social and political process, 
which maintains the exploitative system of 
connections and strategic disassociations 
that characterize the spatial form in the city. 
As a city where rights are often suspended, 
the urban experience is one where the urban 
dweller never forgets the importance of edges, 
perimeters, borders and crossings. This form 
of urban territorial organization is an outcome 
of the legacies of colonialism and deeply 
inequitable local practices which continue to 
enforce Nairobi’s relationship to the inward 
investor and the tourist rather than support 
the rights of the urban inhabitant. Hawkers 
play a pivotal role in this urban drama. Their 
future and the attempts to re-order Nairobi 
city centre has emerged as a key site where 
debates over the global and local versions 
of the city and the contest between different 
developmental futures are acted out.
Beneath the rhetoric of Kenya Vision 2030, 
is a labyrinthine economy of street vendors, 
hawkers, rubbish collectors, casual labourers, 
shoe-shiners, house-cleaners, hairdressers, 
and small retailers- emerging daily from the 
slums, and villages in the adjacent countryside 
areas. In spite of the Kibaki government’s claim 
that it would during its first period of office 
create 00,000 new jobs for unemployed 
youth who are drawn into these occupations, 
instead, one of the key impacts of structural 
adjustments it has overseen has been the 
growth of the informal rather than the formal 
sector of the economy. As Ogola (2007) notes, 
‘Kenya’s problem, as in most of Africa, may 
not be the capacity to generate wealth but the 
resolve to distribute this wealth evenly’. This 
vast population feels deeply disenfranchised 
– a politically sensibility that transcends 
tribal allegiances, and which continues to 
fuel the uprising of the poor in Kenya today, 
particularly after the disputed general election. 
Hence, time and time again, the question as 
to why there are so many hawkers in Nairobi 
in the first place is answered by another set of 
questions which draws attention to structural 
and institutional inequality: namely - why is 
there such a massive migration from rural 
areas to Nairobi? Where are the city’s markets? 
Why where these markets never built? And 
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ultimately, in whose image is the future of the 
city and of Kenya being imagined? 
Notwithstanding attempts to recast hawkers 
and the Juli Kali sector as the nation’s 
entrepreneurs in pre-election propaganda, in 
practice, the spaces of neo-liberalism, which 
requires the spatiality of the ‘hub’, will ensure 
that these people risk being further excluded 
from the formal map of the city, despite their 
real economic potential. As it is currently 
configured, Kenya’s competitive advantage 
relies not only on commodities but a cheap 
labour force that subsists permanently on 
the margins. As the gateway to one the 
‘last emerging markets’, Nairobi is a focus 
for new forms of capitalist accumulation, in 
which the poor, once again are the losers. At 
issue here also, is the erosion of right-based 
approaches to the distribution of resources 
in the city. These rights were also an obstacle 
to colonialism and remain obstacles to the 
remaking of political–economic space in the 
image of neo-liberal globalists. There was 
no call in the 2007 election campaign for to 
offer slum dwellers right to their property as 
was done in Brazil during the 1980s, and 
no deal offered to street hawkers, except 
the promise of new markets and temporary 
reprieve from expulsion from the city centre. 
These problems reveal a deep structural 
problem in Nairobi.  By suppressing these 
spaces of labour – Nairobi is a city that aims 
to be planned and managed for international 
investment – an economic priority that has a 
spatial imperative that supersedes the needs 
of the poor. As revealed in the expulsion of 
street hawkers from the streets of Nairobi, the 
confluence of racial and economic conditions 
found in the spatial structure of the residential 
segregation of city is remade in the control 
of the city centre – reflecting the entwined 
qualities of the spatial and ideological logic 
of the unequal urban archipelago. Until 
these issues are addressed in the vision for 
Kenya, and the rights of urban populace 
are restored, the perpetual reproduction 
of inequality in Nairobi will remain intact 
and unbroken.
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